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ABSTRACT

This Article draws upon recent social psychological
research to demonstrate the psychological difficulty of
distinguishingbetween torture and enhanced interrogation. We
critique the accuracy of evaluations made under the current
torture standard using two constructs-reliability and
validity-that are employed in the social sciences to assess the
quality of a construct or metric. We argue that evaluations of
interrogation tactics using the current standard are both
unreliable and invalid. We first argue that the torture standard
is unreliable because of the marked variation in the manner in
which different jurisdictions interpret and employ it. Next, we
draw on recent social psychological research to demonstrate the
standard's invalidity. We identify the existence of two separate
systematic psychological biases that impede objective
application of the torture standard. First, the self-serving
bias-a bias that motivates evaluators to interpret facts or rules
in a way that suits their interests-leads administrators to
promote narrower interpretationsof torture when faced with a
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perceived threat to their own, as compared with other nations,
security. Thus, the threshold for torture is tendentiously raised
during exactly the periods of time when torture is most likely to
be used. Second, our own research on the hot-cold empathy gap
suggests that an assessment of an interrogationtactic's severity
is influenced by the momentary visceral state of the evaluator.
People who are not currently experiencing a visceral state-such
as pain, hunger, or fear-tend to systematically underestimate
the severity of the visceral state. We argue that, because the
people who evaluate interrogation tactics are unlikely to be in
the visceral state induced by the tactic when making their
evaluations, the hot-cold empathy gap results in systematic
underestimation of the severity of tactics. Therefore, the hotcold empathy gap leads to the application of an underinclusive
conception of "torture" in domestic interrogation policy and
internationaltorture law.
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TORTURE IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER

INTRODUCTION
[Torture] presupposes, it requires, it craves the abrogation of our
capacity to imagine others' suffering, dehumanizing them so much that
their pain is not our pain .... [It places] the victim outside and beyond
any form of compassion or empathy, but also demands of everyone else
the same distancing,the same numbness ....
1

-Ariel Dorfman

Whatever the realities of current practice, states have formed a
remarkable consensus regarding the unacceptability of employing
2
torture to procure information from political detainees. Torture is
unconditionally banned by a wide range of international treaties,

Ariel Dorfman, Forward: The Tyranny of Terror: Is Torture Inevitable in
1.
Our Century and Beyond?, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 8 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 59 ("[I]t
2.
has long been recognised that the right . .. not to be subjected to torture ... enshrines
one of the fundamental values of democratic society. It is an absolute right, permitting
of no exception in any circumstances."); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1,
Trial Chamber Judgment, T 144 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10,
1998).
It should be noted that the prohibition of torture laid down in human rights
treaties enshrines an absolute right, which can never be derogated from, not
even in time of emergency. . . . This is linked to the fact . . . that the prohibition

on torture is a peremptory norm or jus cogens.
144 (emphasis added). All International
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, at
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cases are made publicly available
at http://www.icty.org. See also CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST
TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 4 (2001) (evidencing the ubiquity of provisions prohibiting
torture by reference to a myriad of international covenants and declarations including
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights); Suzanne M. Bernard, An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of
International Law on the Humane Treatment of Prisoners,25 RUTGERS L.J. 759, 789
(1994) (noting that the torture prohibition appears in more than sixty-five countries'
national constitutions); Erika de Wet, The Prohibitionof Torture as an International
Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 97 (2004) (providing a general academic discussion of the universality of the
torture prohibition warranting its elevation to the status of jus cogens).
The Convention's definition of torture is regularly claimed as the most universally
accepted definition of torture. See, e.g., GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 6 (2005);
BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 499 (2007); Kenneth Lasson, Torture, Truth
Serum, and Ticking Bombs: Toward a PragmaticPerspective on Coercive Interrogation,
39 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 329, 334 (2008). As such, the Convention's definition will be
assumed the authoritative legal definition of torture throughout this Article.
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including the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT), 3 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 4 and the four
Rather than admitting any intentional
Geneva Conventions.5
decision to torture detainees, countries responding to a charge of
torture typically mount one of three standard defenses: (1) denial that
the claimed acts occurred; (2) denial of personal responsibility, e.g.,
claiming that the torture was carried out by "rogue" subordinates; or
(3) denial that the relevant interrogation techniques constitute
torture. The fact that individuals and nations rarely, if ever,
acknowledge that they committed torture underlines the
sacrosanctity with which the prohibition of torture is generally
regarded.
Torture is to nations, however, what adultery is to politiciansan act that is both condemned and committed with numbing
frequency. Like adultery, torture often occurs in the heat of the
moment, when a nation feels acutely threatened. Also like adultery,
as exemplified by President Clinton's denial that he had "sex" with
Monica Lewinsky, there is often much greater agreement about the
unacceptability of the act than about how, exactly, the act should be
defined.
The problem is perfectly illustrated by the controversy
surrounding the interrogation tactics employed by the United States
in CIA secret prisons, 6 including waterboarding, forced abstention

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
3.
Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 4, 7, Dec. 16,
4.
1966, S. EXEC. Doc. No. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]
(providing in Article 7 that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment," with an accompanying non-derogation clause in
Article 4).
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
5.
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 17,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("No physical or mental torture, nor any
other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information of any kind whatever."); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions provides an express prohibition against
the use of cruel treatment and torture against civilians or unarmed members of the
armed forces. Throughout this Article, we will refer to the compendium of treaties and
conventions that seek to limit torture collectively as "the torture prohibition."
See, e.g., Martha Minow, What Is the Greatest Evil?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
6.
2134, 2134 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS

IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004)) ("Images of prisoner abuse at the hands of American
troops at Abu Ghraib circulate the globe and supply evidence to support the worst
charges of American arrogance and depravity.").
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from sleep, and enclosure within a dark, confined box with insects.7
The debate surrounding these "enhanced interrogation tactics" (as
they have been euphemistically called) has not centered on whether
or not torturing prisoners is permissible, but rather on whether or not
any of these tactics amounted to torture.8 This highlights a vexing
reality of international law: it is often easier for everyone to agree to
wholly abjure an act than on what, exactly, that act is.
The frequency with which debates arise over whether particular
acts constitute torture poses a serious challenge to the popular belief
that torture is easily distinguishable from less severe tactics-that
there is a discernable bright line between torture and other cruel
treatment. Proponents of this school of thought allude to a kind of
gut instinct (what Jeremy Waldron has colorfully characterized as "a
sort of visceral 'puke' test") that can be relied on to recognize true
torture.9 Although no a priori categorical definition of torture can
conceivably be chiseled out, the argument goes, torture remains
easily recognizable because "you know it when you see it."10 In
describing just how one can recognize torture, a slew of visceral
responses have been cited. For example, former U.S. Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Mark Richard suggested that the concept
of torture encompasses "conduct the mere mention of which sends

See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
7.
Justice, to Alberto G. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Bybee Memorandum] (interpreting the definition of "torture" under the CAT "in the
context of the conduct of interrogations outside the United States"), reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005).
The practice of torture in the modern era is not limited to the United States, but
appears unsettlingly ubiquitous across developed nations, suggesting that this affront
to civilized society "is not just a rogue-state, third-world, banana-republic
phenomenon." Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudencefor the White
House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1684 (2005); see also Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of
Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21, 27 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989) (stating
that contemporary torture has "flourished on a colossal scale").
See, e.g., Clark Hoyt, Op-Ed., Telling the Brutal Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
8.
26, 2009, at WK12 (discussing the debate among media outlets about whether to
characterize the tactics adopted by the CIA as "torture").
Waldron, supra note 7, at 1695 (complaining that "the trouble [with such a
9.
test] is that we seem to puke or chill at different things").
Torture and the Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of Detainees:
10.
The Effectiveness and Consequences of 'Enhanced'Interrogation:HearingBefore the H.
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110th Cong. 59 (2007)
[hereinafter Convention on 'Enhanced'Interrogation] (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt,
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (claiming that this is what "the [George W. Bush]
Administration would have us believe"); see also Ralf Alleweldt, Protection Against
Expulsion Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 360, 363 (1993) ("The concept of torture, in its core, needs no definition.
Torture, be it performed by physical or modern psychological methods, is easily
recognizable.").
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chills down one's spine,"" and former CIA instructor Malcolm Nance
stated that the "acts and calumnies" that comprise torture "force us to
look away for [a] moment."12
Rejecting the gut instinct test, this Article argues that a bright
line between torture and enhanced interrogation is exceedingly
difficult to draw in an objective fashion. In fact, contrary to the
aforementioned assumption that visceral reactions are a reliable aid
in distinguishing between enhanced tactics and torture, this Article
contends that the psychological complexity of visceral experience
actually obstructs our ability to arrive at an unbiased evaluation of
what constitutes torture. Specifically, we argue that evaluations of
enhanced interrogation tactics are subject to a "hot-to-cold empathy
gap," a psychological phenomenon that impedes the ability of people
to evaluate viscerally charged experiences that they are not
immediately experiencing.13 The empathy gap captures the insight,
documented in numerous empirical studies, that people who are not
currently experiencing a visceral hot state-herein defined as any
compelling aversive emotional state such as fear, hunger, fatigue, or
pain-regularly underestimate its intensity.14
We recently conducted a series of experiments to gauge whether
the empathy gap affects evaluations of enhanced interrogation
tactics.' 5 These experiments confirm that people suffer from innate
empathic biases when assessing the severity of interrogation tactics.
In a series of three social psychological experiments, we found that
individuals who are currently experiencing a state that is induced by
an enhanced interrogation tactic-for example, fatigue, coldness, or
social isolation-tend to evaluate that tactic as significantly more
painful and unethical than participants who are not experiencing the
state. People experiencing a visceral state are also more likely than
11.
Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong. 16 (1990) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture Hearing]
(statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
More recently, Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury claimed that only
those interrogation tactics that "shock the conscience" are prohibited as
unconstitutional. Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,110th Cong. 18 (2008).
12.
Convention on 'Enhanced' Interrogation,supra note 10, at 60 (statement of
Malcolm W. Nance, Anti-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Specialist, Former
Survive, Evade, Resist, Extract (SERE) Instructor).
Loran F. Nordgren et al., Visceral Drives in Retrospect: ExplanationsAbout
13.
the Inaccessible Past, 17 PSYCHOL. SCl. 635, 635 (2007) (citing George Loewenstein, Out
of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.

DECISION PROCESSES 272, 284-85 (1996)).
See, e.g., id. at 635 ("Empirical studies in a number of domains confirm the
14.
tendency to underestimate the effect of visceral drives.").
Loran F. Nordgren et al., What Constitutes Torture? Psychological
15.
Impediments to an Objective Evaluation of Interrogation Tactics, PSYCHOL. Scl.
(forthcoming) (on file with authors).
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others to classify as torture (as opposed to "interrogation") a tactic
Therefore, in direct contradiction to
that induces that state.
arguments that the line between torture and enhanced interrogation
can be determined by reference to a visceral response, our research
suggests that the perceived line between torture and enhanced
interrogation actually shifts with the visceral experience of the
evaluator. Moreover, because administrators and judges evaluating
interrogation tactics are unlikely to be experiencing a significantly
elevated visceral state when making their evaluations, our findings
suggest that they are at risk of systematically underestimating the
severity of the tactics. This underestimation could lead them to apply
an underinclusive conception of "torture" in domestic interrogation
policy and international torture law.
The ultimate goal of this Article is to identify the psychological
reasons why, under stressful conditions, even well-meaning countries
will err on the side of violating norms against torture. We first draw
on recent psychological research that demonstrates (1) the difficulty
of demarcating a bright line between torture and enhanced
interrogation tactics, and (2) the mechanisms driving a psychological
tendency to endorse an underinclusive conception of torture in
periods of political distress.
In critiquing the human ability to objectively identify torture, we
will employ two critical concepts that are utilized in the natural and
social sciences to assess the quality of a construct or measure (such as
IQ, happiness, or, in the case of torture, severity of suffering):
reliability and validity.1 6 Reliability indicates the degree to which a
measure yields consistent results.' 7 Validity indicates the degree to
which a measure yields meaningful results, or the extent to which the
18
test in question is actually measuring what it purports to measure.
A measure is considered invalid if it does not accurately measure
what it is intended to measure. Applying these concepts, we argue
that current legal definitions of torture are both unreliable and
invalid. Efforts to objectively implement current torture standards
are unreliable because different evaluators interpret torture to mean
different things. A comparative review of torture jurisprudence
suggests very low levels of concordance across judges and
jurisdictions, especially with regard to the status of so-called

See generally EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY
16.
AND VALIDITY ASSESSMENT 11-13 (1979) (explaining how reliability and validity can be
assessed to determine the viability of empirical metrics in social scientific research).
See 3 Ross E. TRAUB, RELIABILITY FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THEORY AND
17.
APPLICATIONS 1 (1994) ("[R]eliability connotes a kind of consistency ... of the
measurements being described.").
See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION:
18.
DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETINGS 37 (1979) (defining validity as the
"best available approximation to the truth or falsity" of a given inference, proposition,
or conclusion).
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"enhanced interrogation tactics" and psychological tactics.
Evaluations of the severity of interrogation tactics are invalid because
of the existence of two separate systematic psychological biases.
First, the self-serving bias-a bias that motivates evaluators to
interpret facts or rules in a way that suits their interests-leads
administrators to promote more narrow interpretations of torture
when faced with a perceived threat to their nations' security. Thus,
the threshold for torture is tendentiously raised during exactly the
periods of time when torture is most likely to be used. Second, as
discussed above, the hot-cold empathy gap impedes evaluators'
ability to make objective assessments of torture. Because of this bias,
an assessment of an interrogation tactic's severity is influenced by
the momentary visceral state of the evaluator, a variable wholly
unrelated to the actual experienced severity of the tactic. Moreover,
because the people who evaluate interrogation tactics are unlikely to
experience extreme visceral states while making their evaluations,
the hot-cold empathy gap causes evaluators to systematically
underestimate the severity of interrogation tactics.
This
underestimation leads to the application of an underinclusive
conception of "torture" in domestic interrogation policy and
international torture law.
Finally, this Article discusses how the difficulty of discerning a
bright line affects the way that we should think about the torture
prohibition more generally. We draw from Jeremy Waldron's adept
and invaluable distinction between a malum in se and a malum
prohibitum approach to the torture prohibition. 19 A malum in se
approach is properly applied to a prohibition that codifies an absolute
wrong, an act that "would be wrong whether positive law prohibited
[it] or not."20 Examples might include rape, murder, or theft. In
contrast, a malum prohibitum offense is treated as though it is only
wrong because the law explicitly forbids it.21 According to this
approach, if an action is not explicitly legally forbidden, it is implicitly
freely permitted. 22
Examples include parking violations or
noncompliance with restrictions limiting the height of a building.
These acts are only intuitively wrong to the extent that they are
expressly forbidden by law. If a zoning regulation prohibits buildings

19.
Waldron, supra note 7, at 1691-93. See infra Part III for definitions of
malum in se and malum prohibitum policy approaches.
20.
See Waldron, supra note 7, at 1701 (warning that "[tihere are some scales
one really should not be on, and with respect to which one really does not have a
legitimate interest in knowing precisely how far along the scale one is permitted to
go"); see also id. at 1699 ("We know that in almost all cases when we replace a vague
standard with an operationalized rule, the cost of diminishing vagueness is an increase
in arbitrariness.").
21.
Id. at 1691-92.
Id.
22.
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from being more than ninety-feet tall, one can assume that an eightynine-foot-tall building is permitted.
A "bright line" between what is prohibited and what is permitted
functions very differently depending on whether a prohibited offense
is interpreted as malum in se or malum prohibitum. Under a malum
prohibitum interpretation of the torture prohibition, a bright line is of
the upmost importance because it, in effect, defines the prohibition.
Interrogators may approach the line with impunity, so long as they do
not cross it. However, under a malum in se approach, a bright line is
much less important. One cannot assume that anything that is not
expressly prohibited is therefore freely permitted. There are some
lines-such as the line defining the crime of child molestation-that
society would rather people stay as far away from as possible.
Therefore, when considering a crime like torture, for which a bright
line is impossible to discern (the standard by which it is defined being
both unreliable and invalid), a malum prohibitum approach is
inherently flawed; in such cases, administrators suffer from an
imminent risk of crossing the line they seek to approach. To overstep
the line means breaching our international obligation to prohibit
absolutely the use of torture. Moreover, crossing the line threatens
our foreign relationships, harms our international reputation, and
endangers our soldiers who are held as detainees by other countries.
Part I of this Article illustrates the unreliability of the torture
standard by drawing on a comparative historical analysis of torture
jurisprudence. We first review the difficulties introduced by the
imprecision of the torture prohibition. This review focuses on the
sources of disparity in judicial and administrative interpretations of
the word "severe." Salient inconsistencies among international courts
center, for example, on what kinds of actions cause "severe" pain and
whether purely mental pain can be "severe" enough to be classified as
torture. Part II introduces psychological research on self-serving and
empathic biases to illustrate the invalidity of the torture standard.
In it, we present our own empirical evidence of the empathy gap's
biasing effects on evaluations of the pain arising from enhanced
Part III discusses what the difficulty of
interrogation tactics.
objectively defining torture means for the way we think about the
torture prohibition more generally. In light of the impossibility of
discerning a bright line between torture and enhanced interrogation,
Part III focuses primarily on a critical assessment of a malum
prohibitum approach to the torture prohibition.

PART

1: THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE TORTURE STANDARD: A
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF TORTURE LAW

The claim that there is a discernable bright line between torture
and enhanced interrogation assumes that current conceptions of
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torture provide a workable metric for identifying torture. When
social scientists assess the quality of a metric or construct, they first
examine whether the construct is reliable, meaning that it yields
consistent results. 23 Social scientists have developed several classes
of reliability and methods for assessing it,24 but one of the more
common tests of reliability is "inter-rater reliability," which asks
whether there is consensus among different judges applying a
metric. 25 This Part demonstrates the unreliability of the torture
standard by conducting a comparative analysis of international
torture jurisprudence that highlights the varied conclusions reached
across jurisdictions. 26
The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) provides the most
explicit international definition of torture, which might explain why
the CAT has become the favored conceptualization of the torture
prohibition in contemporary international jurisprudence. 27 Central to
the CAT's definition of torture is its requirement that a torturous
action inflict "severe" mental or physical pain.28 The severity of pain
has been extensively utilized as the standard setting torture apart

See generally 3 TRAUB, supra note 17 (developing a concept of reliability
23.
with reference to educational and psychological measurements).
See, e.g., KILEM L. GWET, HANDBOOK OF INTER-RATER RELIABILITY (2d ed.
24.
2010); Frank E. Saal et al., Rating the Ratings: Assessing the Psychometric Quality of
Rating Data, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 413, 419 (1980).
See Saal et al., supra note 24, at 419.
25.
26.
See, e.g., Julianne Harper, Comment, Defining Torture: Bridging the Gap
Between Rhetoric and Reality, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 901 (2009) (complaining
that the "lack of clarity regarding what constitutes 'severe pain or suffering' has given
international courts remarkable latitude in their interpretations of the Torture
Convention's severity requirement").
See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 2, at 6; VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 2, at
27.
499; Lasson, supra note 2, at 334.
See, e.g., Anthony Cullen, Defining Torture in International Law: A
28.
Critique of the Concept Employed by the European Court of Human Rights, 34 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 29, 32 (2003) (quoting Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Trial
Chamber Judgment, $ 142 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001))
(identifying the severity of endured pain as the "distinguishing characteristic of torture
that sets it apart from similar offences").
In fact, the word "severe" was a source of much debate among the Convention's
drafters who held heated debates regarding whether severe should be deleted or
replaced by "extreme" or "extremely severe." See AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 16 (1999); J.
HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST

TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 117-18 (1988). The Convention's
torture definition also requires that the pain be intentionally inflicted for a specific
purpose, such as to acquire information, and that the perpetrator be someone acting in
an official capacity. See CAT, supra note 3, art. 1. For a more comprehensive discussion
of the definition of torture as applied in international and human rights law, see Nigel
S. Rodley, The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, in CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 467-93 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 2002).
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from lesser offenses in international human rights law.2 9 Of course,
whereas the ban on torture is intended to be absolute,30 the word
"severe," alone, offers only minimal interpretive guidance. 3 '
Courts applying the CAT's torture standard argue that the
severity threshold warrants the attachment of a "special stigma" 32 to
set torturous actions apart from other "cruel, inhuman or degrading"
treatments that provoke less exacting consequences.33 The definition
of torture by comparison to less severe actions is one unifying strain
The
in geographically disparate torture jurisprudence. 34
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for
example, defines torture by reference to other actions provoking
''serious mental and physical suffering that falls short of the severe
mental and physical suffering required for the offense of torture."3 5
In Brd'anin, the Trial Chamber explained that "[t]he seriousness of
the pain or suffering sets torture apart from other forms of
mistreatment." 36 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) suggests that "[i]n determining whether a particular form of

29.
See, e.g., Kvocka, Case No. IT-98--30/1-T, T 142; Cullen, supra note 28, at
32 (suggesting that the severity of pain as the distinguishing factor of torture "is
reflected in the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the European Court of Human Rights and
the Human Rights Committee").
30.
See CAT, supra note 3, art. 2 ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."); Louise Arbour, UN
High Comm'r for Human Rights, Statement Made for Human Rights Day: On
Terrorists and Torturers (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/
huricane.nsf/0/3B9B202D5A6DCDBCC12570D00034CF83?opendocument (calling the
"absolute" prohibition of torture "a cornerstone of the international human rights
edifice").
31.

NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW 98 (2d ed. 1999) ("To sum up on the issue of how severe or aggravated inhuman
treatment has to be for it to amount to torture is virtually impossible."); see also
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) (1978) (separate opinion of Judge
Zekia) (conceding that "the word 'torture' . . . is not capable of an exact and
comprehensive definition"); Cullen, supra note 28, at 33 ("Although the term 'severe' is
vague and open to interpretation, to include a specific threshold of pain or suffering in
the definition would arguably result in an excessive limitation on its application.").
Aydin v. Turkey, App. No. 23178/94, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 251, 1 82 (1997).
32.
See CAT, supra note 3, art. 16 (noting that torture is an extreme version of
33.
"cruel, inhuman or degrading" treatment).
See Lisa Yarwood, Defining Torture: The Potential for Abuse,' 2008 J. INST.
34.
JUST. INT'L STUD. 324, 327 (2008) ("The variety in expressions of the prohibition
[against torture] is substantively unified in defining torture to the exclusion of
'inhuman treatment."').
Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
35.
1 161 n.318 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001).
Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Trial Chamber Judgment, 483
36.
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004). This standard was not
rejected in the case's recent appeal, Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Appeals
Chamber Judgment,
241-50 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3,
2007).
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ill-treatment should be qualified as torture, consideration must be
given to the distinction . .. between this notion and that of inhuman

or degrading treatment."3 7 This trend is equally present in U.S.
guidance issued during the Reagan Administration, which classified
torture as existing "at the extreme end of cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment." 38 The distinction between
torture and cruel or inhuman treatment is given particular emphasis
because, while the CAT introduces an absolute ban on "torture," it
only imposes an obligation to "undertake to prevent" cruel or
inhuman treatment.3 9 Some commentators point to this difference to
substantiate an argument that, rather than being prohibited
absolutely, cruel or inhuman treatments can be employed when
extreme circumstances warrant more forceful interrogations. As the
United States argued in a memo released contemporaneously with
the CAT's finalization, "the attempt to establish the same obligations
for torture as for lesser forms of treatment would result either in
defining obligations concerning [cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment] that were overly stringent or in defining obligations
concerning torture that were overly weak." 40
Some interrogation tactics seem to be clearly recognized as
torture and universally condemned. U.S. officials have provided some
examples of these most obvious manifestations of torture, including
"the needle under the fingernail, the application of electric shock to
the genital area, [and] the piercing of eyeballs," 41 as well as
"sustained systematic beating ... and tying up or hanging in
positions that cause extreme pain." 42 Past guidance from the ECHR
includes arbitrary arrests and custodial deaths among the acts that

313 (2003), available at
Aktas v. Turkey, App. No. 24351/94,
37.
http://www.echr.coe.int.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE
38.
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 3 [hereinafter MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT].
CAT, supranote 3, art. 16.
39.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 38, at 15. The United States
40.
has only agreed to prevent cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatments "insofar as the
term means the cruel, unusual and inhuman treatment or punishment prohibited by
the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States." 136 CONG. REC. S17,491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); see also HernAn Reyes, The
Worst Scars Are in the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS
591, 593 (2007) (noting that the CAT "impos[es] on states 'only' the obligation to
'undertake to prevent' cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment," and that "[s]tates have
used this to argue that while torture is forbidden, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment may be justified under exceptional circumstances).
Bybee Memorandum, supra note 7, at 19-20.
41.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 38, at 13-14.
42.
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facially qualify as torture.43 Similarly, the ICTY carved out a special
category for facially obvious manifestations of torture that "establish
per se the suffering of those upon whom they were inflicted."4 4 In
ICTY jurisprudence, once the prosecution proves the occurrence of
acts that fall into this category, which includes rape and mutilation of
body parts, 45 the prosecution is absolved of the burden of providing a
medical certificate to prove their severity, because the acts
conclusively imply the requisite severity for torture.46
However, outside of these most horrific archetypes of torture,
courts differ substantially in their interpretation of precisely where
the line should be drawn to separate torture from cruel treatments.
In particular, enhanced interrogation tactics and psychological
interrogation tactics generate considerable disagreement across
jurisdictions.
Enhanced interrogation tactics are ambiguous almost by design.
They are the product of deliberate attempts to engineer tactics that
provoke subtle forms of pain, relying on technological, psychological,
and pharmacological innovations that maximize the pain or
discomfort of the detainee's experience while leaving minimal
Examples include sleep
perceptible evidence of brutality. 47

43.
See Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413,
45-56, 80 (1996) (reviewing evidence that such practices were taking place in India,
and holding that such practices are "contrary to Article 3").
44.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, 1 150 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
45.
Prosecutor v. Kvodka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
144 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001).
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, 1 150.
46.

11

47.

See, e.g., Convention Against Torture Hearing, supra note 11, at 94

(statement of Human Rights Watch) ("In recent years governments that practice
torture increasingly have sought to devise methods that cause intense pain but leave
no marks. The era of psychological torture appears to be ahead of us."); AMNESTY INT'L,
TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 15 (1984) ("The treatment in law of torture, whether by
definition or in jurisprudence, must keep pace with modern technology, which is
capable of inducing severe psychological suffering without resort to any overt physical
brutality."); see also Herbert Radtke, Torture As an Illegal Means of Control, in THE
DEATH PENALTY AND TORTURE 3, 4-5 (Franz Bockle & Jacques Pohier eds., Miranda
Chayton trans., 1979) ("Torture is becoming increasingly scientific. Alongside physical
brutality and mutilation, the use of sophisticated mechanised equipment is becoming
more and more common. A particular cause for concern is the growth of psychological
and pharmacological methods of torture.").
The increasingly compromised role played by doctors in the development and
administration of interrogation tactics is a testament to the trend towards the scientific
enhancement of interrogation. As one commentator notes, "[w]hile once doctors present
at an interrogation were generally there to prevent the victim's death, today medical
science plays an active role in improving the torturer's techniques." Radtke, supra, at
4. In an effort to quell the escalating entanglement of medical professionals in the
practice of interrogation, the American Psychological Association voted in 2007 to bar
their members from any future involvement in a number of commonly employed
interrogation practices, including forced sleep deprivation, assumption of painful bodily
positions, and exposure to extreme temperatures. See Shankar Vedantam, APA Rules
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deprivation, forced assumption of painful physical positions, or
exposure to extreme temperatures.
Psychological interrogation tactics likewise present a category
rife in ambiguity, in part because, by definition, the misery such
tactics produce is entirely "in the mind." 48 Widely employed
psychological tactics include the exploitation of phobias, the breaking
of sexual taboos, and solitary confinement.4 9
Because many of these enhanced interrogation and psychological
interrogation tactics involve subjecting detainees to visceral
sensations that people regularly experience to some degree or
another-such as feeling cold, fatigued, hungry, or lonely-they are
less recognizably painful than more shocking forms of physical
However, the suffering induced by enhanced and
brutality.5 0
psychological interrogation, though exceedingly difficult to ascertain
and measure,5 1 can be just as harmful as more obvious forms of
Several medical studies have concluded that purely
torture.
psychological tactics are capable of causing as much long-term mental
damage and emotional suffering as their physical counterparts. 52

on Interrogation Abuse: Psychologists' Group Bars Member Participation in Certain
Techniques, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2007, at A03 (referring to the prohibited
interrogation methods as "immoral, psychologically damaging and counterproductive in
eliciting useful information").
48.
See, e.g., Reyes, supra note 40, at 596 ("Physical forms of pain and suffering
are more readily understood than psychological forms, although physical suffering may
also be hard to quantify and measure objectively. .. ."); see also id. ("[Tihe notion of
'intensity of suffering' is not susceptible of precise gradation, and in the case of mainly
mental as opposed to physical suffering, there may be an aura of uncertainty as to
how ... [to assess] the matter in any individual case." (quoting Sir Nigel Rodley,
former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, the Bush Administration complained that the concept of mental harm
referenced in the CAT was the source of its "greatest problem" with the Convention,
because "mental suffering is often transitory, causing no lasting harm." Convention
Against Torture Hearing, supra note 11, at 17 (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
Reyes, supra note 40, at 604-08; see also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note
49.
28, at 118 (listing recognized forms of psychological torture, including mock executions,
being forced to watch or hear the torture of others, prolonged isolation, and deprivation
of light, food, sleep, or water).
See, e.g., Clifford D. May, Op-Ed., Interrogation Tactics Weren't Torture,
50.
American Officials Shouldn't Be Prosecuted, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 18, 2009,
available at http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/05/18/interrogation-tacticswerent-torture-american-officials-shouldnt-be-prosecuted.html (suggesting that many
of the techniques reviewed in the torture memos, including "sleep deprivation, 'stress
positions,' and the playing of loud music [are] hardly what most people (much less the
relevant laws) would define as torture").
See Yarwood, supra note 34, at 336 ("Psychological manifestations of
51.
torture challenge reliance on a solely objective analysis of suffering, due to the
difficulties in measuring intangible psychological injuries.").
52.
See Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, Effects of Sensory Deprivation in
Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary Confinement, 8 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 49, 53-55
(1986) (reporting that solitary confinement can cause hallucinations, extreme anxiety,
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Additionally, in a 2007 study of the long-term psychological effects of
torture, researchers compared the effects of enhanced interrogation
methods, such as isolation and stress positions, with obvious forms of
physical torture.5 3 The researchers concluded that the effects of the
enhanced tactics did "not seem to be substantially different from
physical torture in terms of the extent of mental suffering they cause,
the underlying mechanisms of traumatic stress, and their long-term
traumatic effects." 54
Some jurisdictions refuse to consider enhanced interrogation and
psychological tactics as torture.5 5 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, for
example, the ECHR ruled that the combined application of five
enhanced interrogation treatments-including hooding, wallstanding, exposure to loud noises, starvation, and sleep deprivation"did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty
implied by the word torture."5 6 Explaining the Court's reasoning,
Judge Fitzmaurice stated that "if the five techniques are to be
regarded as involving torture, how does one characterize e.g. having
one's finger-nails torn out, being slowly impaled on a stake through
the rectum, or roasted over an electric grid?"57 The United States
adopts a relatively tolerant stance toward psychological interrogation
methods, eschewing only mental suffering that is "prolonged" and
arises "from the infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering"; "the administration ... of mind altering substances";
or the threat that death or pain will be inflicted on another person.5 8
However, other jurisdictions hold that tactics that are not
facially obvious examples of torture may amount to torture in some
situations. The ICTY, for example, explicitly leaves open the
possibility that more subtle tactics might amount to torture,
depending on how they are administered and the situations in which
they occur: 59 "it is no requirement that [torture's] suffering [be]

hypersensitivity, and an inclination to induce self-harm); Alan Zarembo, Psychological

Torture Just as Bad, Study Finds: Damage Is Equal to That from Physical Abuse,
InvestigatorsReport, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at A4.

53.
Metin Basogul et al., Torture vs. Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment: Is the Distinction Real or Apparent?, 64 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 277,
277, 284 (2007).
54.
Id. at 284; see also Jessica Wolfendale, The Myth of 'Torture Lite," 23
ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 47, 50-51 (2009) 62 (providing other examples of people who, when
subjected to enhanced tactics, suffered from long-term amnesia and psychosis).

55.

Barry M. Klayman, The Definition of Torture in International Law, 51

TEMP. L.Q. 449, 498 (1978) (suggesting that under the definition of torture adopted in
the Ireland v. United Kingdom case, torture is largely limited to "only [the] most brutal
and atrocious behavior[s]").
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 167 (1978).
56.
Id. 1 35 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
57.
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(4) (2010).
58.
59.
For example, while the ICTY jurisprudence instructs that the most
barbaric acts constituting per se torture are sufficient for a finding of torture, no one
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visible ... [and therefore] no defence that victims did not show effects
of physical or mental pain or suffering.""o The ECHR also adopts a
broader understanding of mental suffering, recognizing that several
classes of psychological interrogation tactics-including intimidation,
humiliation, threats to others, and sensory deprivation-can provoke
the requisite suffering to amount to torture. 61
In conclusion, whereas there is a broad consensus that the most
shocking or repulsive archetypes of torture should be classified as
such, tactics that straddle the line between torture and interrogation
generate divergent international applications of the torture
standard. 62 In particular, some jurisdictions tolerate enhanced
interrogation tactics and psychological tactics-such as those that
were controversially employed during the Bush Administration 63 while other jurisdictions condemn these tactics as torture. This
disparity in interpretation highlights the practical difficulty of
drawing a bright line between torture and cruel or inhuman
treatment. These differences suggest that the torture standard, as
currently interpreted and applied, lacks reliability.
A commonplace in social science methodology is that reliability is
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for validity. 64 If different
type of treatment or tactic is categorically necessary for a determination that an
interrogation involved torture; instead, the Court evaluates the severity of
interrogation treatments on a case-by-case basis. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 2,
at 517.
60.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, IT 135, 150 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
61.
For a thorough discussion of the history of the case law in this area, see
Love Kellberg, The Case-Law of the European Commission of Human Rights on Art. 3
of the ECHR, in THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TORTURE 97, 104 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1991). See also Akkog v. Turkey, App. Nos. 22947/93 & 22948/93, 2000-X
116-17 (2000) (holding that threats directed at a woman's
Eur. Ct. H.R. 456,
children, ultimately causing diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder, amounted to
torture).
See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L.
62.
REV. 1425, 1437-38 (2005).
There is a vast difference . . . between the ancient world of torture, with its
appalling mutilations . .. and the tortures that liberals might accept: sleep
deprivation, prolonged standing in stress positions, extremes of heat and cold,
bright lights and loud music-what some refer to as 'torture lite.' . . . [L]iberals
generally draw the line at forms of torture that maim the victim's body.
This ...
marks an undeniable moderation in torture, the world's most
immoderate practice.
Id.; see also Wolfendale, supra note 54, at 58 (arguing that there is no veritable
distinction between enhanced interrogation and torture that would permit use of the
former); Joseph Lelyveld, Interrogating Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 6
(Magazine), at 12 (distinguishing between enhanced interrogation and torture, and
arguing for the permissibility of forms of enhanced interrogation).
See supra notes 26, 28, 31, 34 and accompanying text.
63.
64.
See Reliability and Validity, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 128, 128 (Antony S.R. Manstead et al. eds., 1996).
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measures of the same construct produce radically different estimates,
there is no way that all of the estimates can be correct. Yet, even if
all of the measures do produce the same estimate, it is not necessarily
the case that the estimate is valid. By virtue of its unreliability, the
torture standard is necessarily invalid. However, as the next Part
demonstrates, the current torture standard is also independently
invalid because its interpretation is distorted by two systematic
psychological biases: the self-serving bias (or motivated reasoning
bias) and the hot-cold empathy gap. Because of self-serving biases,
policy makers are naturally motivated to construe the torture
prohibition narrowly during periods when they feel that their
national security is threatened. As a result of the hot-cold empathy
gap, it is extremely difficult for those that are removed from the firsthand experience of torture to understand the extent of its severity.
PART II: THE INVALIDITY OF THE TORTURE STANDARD:
SYSTEMATIC PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES AFFECTING
EVALUATIONS OF INTERROGATION TACTICS

In addition to reliability, social scientists evaluate the quality of
a measure or a construct with reference to its validity. Whereas a
measure's reliability captures the consistency with which it is
applied, validity gauges the measure's accuracy, or the degree to
which the metric successfully captures the construct it is intended to
measure. 65 To understand this distinction, imagine that a scientist
uses a weighing scale to measure intelligence. The scale may very
well produce reliable results; it would provide the correct weight each
time that a person stepped onto it. However, the metric would
nevertheless be invalid because a person's weight is not an accurate
proxy for intelligence.
The validity of the torture standard requires accurate
assessments at two distinct levels. First, at a general level, it
requires judges to correctly identify the precise point at which pain
becomes severe enough to amount to torture. Second, and more
specifically, it requires judges to accurately ascertain the severity of
pain or discomfort that a given interrogation tactic has caused or will
cause a detainee. 66 Unfortunately, evaluations at each of these levels
are impeded by psychological biases. First, due to self-serving biases
and motivated reasoning, policy makers will be inclined to allow more
painful interrogation tactics when their nations are experiencing

65.
See COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 18, at 37 (referring to "validity"as "the
best available approximation to the truth or falsity of propositions").

66.

See Jari Pirjola, Shadows in Paradise-ExploringNon-Refoulement As an

Open Concept, 19 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 639, 651 (2007) (characterizing this question as
one that "remains open to interpretation").
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political turmoil or paranoia. Second, empathic biases cloud judges'
ability to correctly evaluate the level of pain provoked by a particular
interrogation tactic. 67 The hot-to-cold empathy gap research suggests
that judges will tendentiously underestimate a tactic's severity if they
are not experiencing the type of pain that the tactic provokes.6 8
Together, these psychological biases suggest that applications of
the severity standard for torture are impacted by at least two factors
that are unrelated to the severity of a tactic: the political situation in
which an evaluation occurs and the evaluator's momentary visceral
state. Insofar as the severity standard changes in response to factors
that are not at all related to a treatment's severity, it is invalid.
A. Self-Serving Biases and Motivated Inference in Evaluations
of InterrogationTactics
In social psychology, the theory of "motivated inference"
describes people's biased tendency to interpret information in a way
that justifies their a priori preferred conclusion. 69 The theory
suggests that, instead of always evaluating available information in a
rational and objective manner, we often enter an analysis with a
preferred conclusion and interpret or selectively favor information to
support that conclusion.70 This tendency is especially strong when
we perceive that we would benefit personally from one potential
conclusion, and psychologists refer to this predilection as the "selfserving bias."7 1 People tend to naturally discount information that
threatens the things that they believe in or enjoy. In one study, for
example, women were given information about the health risks of
caffeine.7 2 The heavy caffeine users were significantly less convinced
by the information than the light caffeine users.7 3 These findings
suggest that women who regularly enjoyed caffeine-who presumably
valued caffeine more-were less motivated to believe that it was
harmful than women who were less committed to caffeine use.
Another study, which employed a mock-litigation scenario, found that
Nordgren et al., supra note 15, at 14 ("[Pleople who are not actively
67.
experiencing pain tend to underestimate its severity.").
See Nordgren et al., supra note 13, at 635-36.
68.
69.
Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation
of Causal Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 636, 636 (1987).
Id.
70.
See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining,
71.
85 AM. EcoN. REV. 1337, 1337 (1995); Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence:
Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 914 (1997); Linda Babcock &
George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases,
11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 109, 110 (1997); Kunda, supra note 69, at 636; George
Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairnessand Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135, 140 (1993).
Kunda, supra note 69, at 642.
72.
Id. at 644.
73.
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the self-serving bias encourages people to make optimistic predictions
of fair settlement awards and the likely outcomes of their cases at
trial. 74 Finally, a survey conducted shortly after 9/11 found that only
15 percent of the people in Arab countries reported believing reports
that the attacks on the twin towers were committed by Arabs.75 This
result suggests that the respondents were motivated to discount
information that implicated someone of their ethnicity in a terrorist
crime. 76
Importantly, however, a favored conclusion does not necessarily
have to be self-serving. For example, several empirical studies
suggest that we are naturally motivated to find a person responsible
for a crime if we believe that the person acted for immoral reasons7 7
or possessed a bad moral character.7 8 When in a heightened
emotional state, e.g., of fear and anger, we are also more likely to
arrive at, or accept, a particularly vivid, novel, or frightening
interpretation of events, even if that interpretation is objectively
unlikely.79 Thus, people generally overestimate the likelihood that
they will be injured in dramatic and frightening events like
tornadoes, floods, 80 and terrorist attacks.8 1
When applied to interrogation, research on motivated reasoning
and self-serving biases suggests that policy makers will have little
difficulty in justifying, both to themselves and others, the use of more

74.

See Loewenstein et al., supra note 71, at 145-53.

75.

See Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68

BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1021-22 (2003).
76.
Id. at 1022.
Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation,63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
77.
368, 369-70 (1992); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126
PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 556 (2000).
Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter Morris McDonnell, The Psychology of Blame:
78.
Criminal Liability and the Role of Moral Character 2 (Dec. 21, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND
79.
FREEDOM IN AN ANxIOUS AGE 74 (2004) ("People believe that they are most likely to be
victimized by the threats of which they are most afraid."); Jules Lobel & George
Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in Foreign
Policy and InternationalLaw, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1073 (2005) (suggesting that
people typically "overreact[] to ...

problems . . . that are vividly described and easy to

visualize").
Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
80.
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982).
See ROSEN, supra note 79, at 73 (providing survey results obtained shortly
81.
after 9/11 that indicated the average person believed that there was a 20 percent
chance that they would be injured in a terrorist attack during the next year); see also
Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 79, at 1070 ('The problem of vivid, emotional
miscalculation of risk is particularly acute in the antiterrorism context, since fear is a
particularly strong emotion. . .. "); Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability
Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 127-28 (2003) ("[The word 'terrorism' evokes
vivid images of a disaster . . . .").
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extreme tactics during periods of crisis.82 At such points, policy
makers regularly argue that they have an interest in, and a
justification for, identifying and implementing measures that, in
times of calm, or if observed being implemented by others, they would
find unacceptable.8 3 The United States' activities after 9/11 illustrate
this risk. Members of the George W. Bush Administration argued
that, in light of the crucial importance of expediently procuring
intelligence from detainees to combat the threat of terrorism, the
United States had an interest in-and a justification for-utilizing
the most extreme interrogation tactics that fall short of torture. 84 As
Vice President Cheney remarked in a 2008 interview aired on NBC,
more stringent interrogation tactics were needed because "We had to
collect good first-rate intelligence about what was going on so we
could prepare and defend against it."8 5 Indeed, in this tense and
urgent political climate, Justice Department officials produced a
remarkably narrow interpretation of the torture prohibition. 86 In one
infamous document-now commonly referred to as the 'Torture

82.
Indeed, a number of distinguished scholars contend that it is proper for
governments to respond to perceived threats by employing a cost-benefit analysis and,
if needed, dramatically increasing the severity of interrogation practices to prevent a
security breach. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS:
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002); RICHARD A.
POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
34 (2006); ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 5 (2007); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729
(2004).
However, Professor Lobel, recognizing psychological tendencies to overestimate
risks and interpret evidence in a way that confirms salient, feared conclusions,
counters that governments may too readily jettison crucial legal rules in favor of ad hoc
balancing in times of perceived crisis. See Jules Lobel, The Preventive Paradigm and
the Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1432-33 (2007). Because this
Article engages with the prohibition of torture under the assumption that it is absolute,
arguments that torture policies ought to be set with reference to a cost-benefit analysis
are beyond the Article's present scope.
83.
Alan Dershowitz demonstrates this phenomenon in his treatise on torture,
wherein he argues that governments can justifiably resort to torture when placed in
situations of extreme duress, such as when a detainee is aware of the location of a
"ticking time bomb" that threatens the lives of innocent citizens. See DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 82, at 132-63.
See, e.g., MSNBC Live (NBC television broadcast Apr. 21, 2008) (arguing
84.
that Vice President Dick Cheney "defend[s] torture because it's effective" in combating
the threat of terrorism).
Id. (quoting Vice President Dick Cheney) (adding "[a]nd that's what we
85.
did .... It worked. It's [sic] been enormously valuable in terms of saving lives,
preventing another mass casualty attack against the United States").
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to Be
86.
Attorney General of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 534-37 (2005) [hereinafter Gonzales Hearing] (statement of Harold
Hongju Koh, Dean, Yale Law School) (criticizing the memo as proffering "a definition of
torture that would have exculpated Saddam Hussein").
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Memo" 8 7-Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee concluded that
"[p]hysical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity
to pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily functions, or even death."8 8
Bybee's narrow interpretation of the severity threshold for
torture allowed the Administration to condone a number of enhanced
interrogation tactics, including deprivation of sleep, food, and water;
solitary confinement; and forced assumption of painful physical
positions.8 9 Some of the permitted tactics-such as the use of dogs to
induce fear-seem more intuitively questionable than others.
Waterboarding, the most controversial of the tactics, is especially
difficult to defend because the United States previously argued in
court that enemy soldiers who employed waterboarding committed
war crimes.90
More recently, the legal academy has vehemently denounced
Bybee's interpretation of the constraints established by the
international torture prohibition. 91 Harold Koh, former Dean of Yale
Law School, called it the "most clearly legally erroneous opinion I
have ever heard."9 2 Although some scholars criticize the opinion as a
product of etiolated ethics within the legal profession,9 3 the memo
also signals several signs of motivated reasoning. Bybee repeatedly
and selectively emphasizes the importance and relevance of
information that supports the conclusion that enhanced tactics are
permitted, while he synchronously discounts or ignores information
that does not support that conclusion. For example, as noted by
Jeremy Waldron, Bybee highlights the Ireland v. United Kingdom
holding that several enhanced interrogation techniques were not

See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, The Torture Memo, THE NATION, Apr. 9, 2008,
87.
available at http://www.thenation.comlprint/article/torture-memo.
Bybee Memorandum, supra note 7, at 171. The severity standard put
88.
forward in the Bybee Memorandum was explicitly rejected by the ICTY in Prosecutor v.
Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Appeals Chamber Decision, T 249 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007). When he replaced Jay Bybee in the Office of
Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith retracted the Bybee Memorandum's opinion about how
the severity standard should be interpreted. See Gillers, supra note 87.
See Arbour, supra note 30 (arguing that the ban on torture has come "under
89.
attack" in the midst of the modern "war on terror").

90.

Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in

U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468, 472 (2007).
For a partial catalogue of the criticism received by the opinion, see Michael
91.
Traynor, Senior Counsel, Cooley Godward LLP, Address for the Sixteenth Thomas E.
Fairchild Lecture: Citizenship in a Time of Repression (Apr. 23, 2004), in 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2005).
Gonzales Hearing,supra note 86, at 536.
92.

93.

See, e.g., Burt Neuborne et al., Torture: The Road to Abu Ghraib and

Beyond, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA, 13-14 (Karen Greenberg ed., 2006)
(warning that the Bybee Memorandum is indicative of more deep-seeded ethical flaws
in the American bar, resulting in too many U.S. lawyers approaching policy advice as
though it were advocacy).
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torture, but he fails to mention that these tactics nonetheless "were
and are absolutely prohibited under the ECHR" as cruel and inhuman
treatments. 94 Perhaps most indicative of motivated reasoning, Bybee
inexplicably grounds his definition of the severity attendant to
torture on a somewhat obscure-and arguably irrelevant-medical
administration statute. 95 As motivated reasoning theory would
predict, Bybee recognized the medical statute as important and
relevant because it allowed him to reach his preferred conclusion:
that enhanced interrogation tactics are fully and freely permitted.
The loose interpretation of the torture prohibition in times of
national emergency is not limited to the United States or to the
current "war on terror." Professor Jules Lobel presents evidence of
the general tendency for security policies to become more
aggressive-under the banner of preventive necessity-in times of
perceived national crisis.96 Such times test the mettle of the torture
prohibition because, though the prohibition was initially crafted to
limit the severity of state interrogation policies, 9 7 states under duress
are incentivized to push the limits in their interrogation policies.98
Most international torture jurisprudence heralds from countries that
were, at the time, plagued with prolonged periods of war and tenuous
security, as occurred in Northern Ireland, bombarded with attacks
from the IRA;99 Israel after a series of lethal terrorist attacks; 0 0 and
the war-battered Balkan states in the 1990s.10 Policies of increased

94.
95.

Waldron, supra note 7, at 1706.
Waldron criticizes Bybee's

strange assumption that a term like "severe pain" takes no color from its
context or from the particular purpose of the provision in which it is found, but
that it unproblematically means the same in a medical administration
statute . . . as it does in an anti-torture statute ....

Id. at 1706.
96.
Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 79, at 1071-82.
97.
Waldron, supra note 7, at 1700 ("[The prohibition on torture is intended
mainly as a constraint on state policy .... .").
See, e.g., Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 79, at 1068 (suggesting that
98.
nations often resort to proactive, coercive prevention when an international threat is
perceived). Some commentators contend that it is proper for governments to respond to
perceived security breaches with dramatically increased interrogation policies. POSNER
& VERMEULE, supra note 82, at 273. However, drawing on psychological tendencies to
overestimate risks and interpret evidence in a way that confirms salient, feared
conclusions, other commentators have countered that governments may too readily
jettison crucial legal rules in favor of ad hoc balancing in times of perceived crisis.
Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 79, at 1068.
See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
99.
See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, 1 1
100.
[1999] (Isr.) (reporting that terrorist attacks had recently killed 121 Israeli citizens).
The "mass atrocities"-including war crimes and genocide-that took place
101.
in the former Yugoslavia during this decade prompted the UN to create the ICTY.
About the ICTY, ICTY.ORG, http://www.icty.org/sections/AboutthelCTY (last visited
Jan. 1, 2011).
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severity can affect citizens as well as foreign nationals, as evidenced
by the infamous forced removal of Japanese-Americans to internment
camps during World War 11.102 Importantly, however, regardless of
whether interrogation practices appear, in retrospect, to be clearly
prohibited, countries and administrations regularly claim that, at the
time, they did not believe the tactics to be torture. This trend
suggests that perceived national security threats affect not only the
interrogation tactics employed, but also the interpretation and
application of the definition of torture. Although motivated reasoning
does not directly threaten an administration's ability to establish a
bright line to define torture, it does suggest that countries are
inclined to shift the bright line to narrow the definition of torture
when facing a national threat. The torture prohibition is intended to
be absolute,1 03 and its boundaries should not be affected by security
However, motivated reasoning when facing security
concerns.
threats may lead to motivated re-definition of torture, rendering the
prohibition less absolute than intended. Thus, motivated reasoning
in the face of security threats represents one potential systematic
bias that threatens the validity of the torture standard.
B. The Hot-to-ColdEmpathy Bias in Evaluations of
InterrogationTactics
The validity of the torture standard also depends on the accuracy
with which courts and policy makers can determine the severity of
pain or discomfort that a particular interrogation tactic provokes.
Unfortunately, psychological research suggests that humans are
extremely ill-equipped to make this judgment. Over the past fifteen
years, psychologists have amassed significant evidence that people
exhibit a "cold-to-hot empathy gap": a tendency for people in a cold,
unemotional state to underestimate the influence that a hot,
emotional state will have on their preferences and behavior. 104
Empirical evidence of empathy gap effects has been found across a
variety of emotional states, including sexual arousal,1 05 hunger, 106

See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 989-97 (2002).
102.
For a discussion of other instances when the United States has abused its citizens' civil
liberties in times of emergencies, see David Cole, No Reason to Believe: Radical

Skepticism, Emergency Power, and Constitutional Constraint,75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329,
1329 (2008).
See supra text accompanying note 30.
103.
Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 272. For a specific discussion of how the
104.
phenomenon relates to the torture context, see id. at 283.
See, e.g., Dan Ariely & George Loewenstein, The Heat of the Moment: The
105.

Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION IIAKING 87
(2006); George Loewenstein et al., The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Predictionof Sexual
Forcefulness, 32 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 443 (1997); Nordgren et al., supra note 13,
at 638.
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fear,1 07 and drug craving.108 For instance, in one of a series of studies
on the fear of embarrassment, researchers asked students in a class
whether they would be willing, in one week's time, to perform an
embarrassing mime in front of their classmates for a small amount of
money.109 Based on the empathy gap, the researchers predicted that
the students, a week removed from the event, would not appreciate
just how embarrassing it would be to mime in front of their
classmates." 0 A week later, the students who indicated that they
would be willing to perform the mime were given the opportunity to
do so."' In line with their prediction, the researchers found that the
number of students who were willing to actually perform the mime
was far smaller than the number of students who, a week before, had
predicted that they would perform the mime.112 Moreover, as the
empathy gap would suggest, when students were shown a scary film
clip prior to making the decision, they were less likely to volunteer to
mime one week later."13 This result suggests that the students who
were feeling some degree of fear were better able to understand the
stage fright that would attend the future mime performance." 4
Empathy gap effects have also been demonstrated for physical
pain, the emotional state most relevant to interrogation methods.
Medical literature, for example, has consistently found that
5
physicians underestimate the severity of their patients' pain."

Loran Nordgren et al., The Restraint Bias: How the Illusion of Self106.
Restraint PromotesImpulsive Behavior, PSYCHOL. SCI. (forthcoming).
Leaf Van Boven et al., The Illusion of Courage in Social Predictions:
107.
Underestimating the Impact of Fear of Embarrassment on Other People, 96 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 130, 130 (2005).
108.
Michael A. Sayette et al., Exploring the Cold-to-Hot Empathy Gap in
Smokers, 19 PSYCHOL. Scl. 926 (2008).
Van Boven et al., supra note 107, at 133.
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
Id. at 134.
112.
113.
See George Loewenstein, Hot-Cold Empathy Gaps and Medical Decision
Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S49, S51 (2005); see also Leaf Van Boven et al., The
Illusion of Courage in Self-Predictions: Mispredicting One's Own Behavior in
Embarrassing Situations, J.
BEHAv.
DECISION
MAKING
(July
2010),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doil10.1002/bdm.706/full (noting similar results when
students were asked, after being shown a clip from a scary movie, if they would tell a
funny story in front of a class in five days time for $2).
114.
See Loewenstein, supra note 113, at S51 (recognizing that "the difference
between anticipated and actual performing is diminished by showing students an
emotionally arousing movie before they make their initial decision"); see also Van
Boven et al., supra note 113 (noting that people who were exposed to the scary film clip
failed to exhibit the "illusion of courage" present in the control group).
115.
See, e.g., M. Hodgkins et al., Comparing Patients' and Their Physicians'
Assessments of Pain, 23 PAIN 273 (1985); Judith Kappesser et al., Testing Two Accounts
of Pain Underestimation, 124 PAIN 109 (2006); Laetitia Marquid et al., Emergency
Physicians' Pain Judgments: Cluster Analyses on Scenarios of Acute Abdominal Pain,
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There is also evidence that patients underestimate the severity of
upcoming medical procedures. For example, one study found that the
majority of pregnant women who intended to go without anesthesia
during childbirth reversed their decisions once they went into
This reversal suggests that they had initially
labor.116
underestimated the intensity of the pain of childbirth.11 7
In one laboratory study, participants were asked whether they
would be willing to undergo pain in exchange for monetary
compensation." 8 Some participants experienced a sample of the pain
while they made their decision, whereas other participants
experienced the sample pain one week before they made their
decision (and thus made their decision pain-free).119 Consistent with
the cold-to-hot empathy gap, participants who experienced the pain
while they made their decision demanded higher compensation than
those who experienced the pain just one week earlier.120
Another experiment used pain to hinder participants'
performances on a memory test.121 Later on, participants were asked
to indicate how the pain and various other factors impacted their
performance.1 22 The researchers found that participants who made
their attributions in a pain-free state underestimated the influence
that pain had on their performance, whereas participants who made
their attributions while experiencing pain accurately assessed its
influence.1 23
Although the majority of research on the hot-cold empathy gap
has focused on the effects of emotional states on judgments and
behaviors, the theoretical explanation for the bias is rooted in a
chronic inability to accurately and abstractly conceive of what the
immediate experience of a visceral state entails. The empathy gap
exists because much of sensory experience cannot be freely and fully
recollected, making it difficult to objectively imagine what it would be
like to experience an aversive state.124 Although people can generally
recall the root and relative force of a visceral drive, they are unable to
summon the more compelling sensational aspects that accompanied

16 QUALITY OF LIFE RES. 1267 (2006); C. Pasero & M. McCaffery, The Undertreatment
ofPain, 101 AM. J. NURSING 62 (2001).
Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement
116.

of Patients' Values: Women's Decisions During Childbirth, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING
47, 47 (1984).
117.
Id.
D. Read & George Loewenstein, EnduringPain for Money: Decisions Based
118.
on the Perceptionand Memory of Pain, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 1 (1999).
Id. at 7.
119.
Id. at 11.
120.
Nordgren et al., supra note,13, at 638.
121.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 639.
See Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 282-83.
124.
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the experience.1 25
Therefore, in attempts to conjure up the
experience of a hot state when one is not in such a state, visceral
states are only available as simulacrum, stripped of the full panoply
of physical and neural fervor that accompanies the experience of a hot
state "in the heat of the moment." Professor Stephen Morley, an
expert in the area, corroborates this argument, as applied to pain, by
concluding that it is extremely rare for subjects' memories of pain to
involve any actual re-experience of the pain.126 Rather, Morley
contends, pain memories generally consist only of a recognition that
some abstract pain once occurred.' 27 This suggests that we are prone
to a predictable inability to appreciate the intensity of painful events
that we are not currently experiencing.
This psychological impediment may encourage torture by leading
people to judge severe enhanced interrogation practices to be morally
or legally acceptable. This may be especially true for enhanced
interrogation tactics-such as sleep deprivation, stress positions,
exposure to cold, and waterboarding-that do not involve conspicuous
brutality or observable physical injury.
In a series of recent experiments designed to directly address
this issue, we asked participants to evaluate three common
interrogation techniques: exposure to cold temperatures, sleep
deprivation, and solitary confinement.' 2 8 We selected these specific
practices because they represent three of the most internationally
ubiquitous enhanced interrogation tactics employed in the modern
era. The active use of sleep deprivation and cold exposure has been
frequently documented in recent global conflicts, including in the
treatment of Tibetan prisoners in China,' 29 Palestinian detainees in
Israel,13 0 U.S. prisoners of war detained by the troops of Saddam
Hussein,' 3 ' and, most recently, alleged terrorists confined at the U.S.
military facilities in Guantanamo Bay. 132 Solitary confinement is

125.
Id.
126.
Stephen Morley, Vivid Memory for "Everyday"Pains,55 PAIN 55, 55 (1993).
127.
Id.
128.
See Nordgren et al., supra note 15.
129.
Choezom v. Mukasey, No. 08-0870, 2008 WL 4898685, at *81 (2d Cir. Nov.
14, 2008) (discussing a State Department report that described how Tibetans were
tortured by the Chinese by being "expos[ed] to cold").
130.
See Barak Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-Rule of Law: The Israeli Legal
System's Failure to Prevent Torture in the Occupied Territories, 12 IND. INT'L & COMP.

L. REV. 75, 85 (2001).
131.
Acee v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, 218 (D.D.C. 2003) (relaying
how prisoners of war were subjected to "excruciating physical and mental torture"
including "severe sleep deprivation" and "intense cold"), vacated, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
132.
See, e.g., Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official: Trial

Overseer Cites 'Abusive' Methods Against 9/11 Suspect, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at
A01.
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used in military interrogations, but it is also extensively practiced by
domestic police and civilian detention centers. 133
In the experiments, subjects were presented with a vignette
describing one of the tacticS134 and were asked to provide an
assessment of: (i) the level of pain or discomfort induced by the tactic;
(ii) the ethicality of the tactic; and (iii) whether the tactic should be
categorized as questioning, interrogation, oppressive interrogation, or
torture.13 5
To test whether an empathy gap affected these
judgments, some participants made the judgments without actually
experiencing the distress of the interrogation tactic, whereas other
participants made the judgments while experiencing a mild version of
the pain produced by the tactic (i.e., fatigue, social exclusion, or
coldness).

133.
For a thoughtful discussion of whether domestic solitary confinement may
approach the status of a cruel and unusual punishment, see Jules Lobel, Prolonged
Solitary Confinement and the Constitution,11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115 (2008).
134.
All experimental forms are on file with the authors. An example of one of
the vignettes extracted from the experiment materials provides:
A female university student in her mid-twenties is reported missing from her
public university. Within twenty-four hours, her family receives a note stating
that the student is being held hostage until a ransom is paid. During the course
of the investigation, police search the homes of four suspects who were most
recently seen with the student before her disappearance. While searching
suspect John James' home, the police find evidence including the missing
student's purse and cell phone. The police bring James in for questioning.
James is initially unwilling to answer any questions the police ask, but the
officers believe that it is crucial to the victim's safety that they extract
information from James. They decide to deprive James of sleep to make him
more willing to share information with them. Sleep deprivation is a common
technique used in such interrogations because it doesn't involve physical
aggression but is still highly effective.
The police kept James awake for 48 straight hours. They used three tactics to
keep him awake that long. (1) Constant interaction: a police officer was always
in the room asking him questions. (2) Stimulants: The police encouraged (but
did not force) James to drink caffeinated drinks. (3) Noise and Lights: When
the interaction and stimulants began to fail, the police used bright lights and
loud music to disrupt his sleep.
135.

Participants were provided the following definitions of the four categories:

1.

Questioning: i.e., the method is always acceptable for government
officials to use.

2.

Interrogation: i.e., the method is acceptable for the government to use
whenever they have probable cause to believe that a suspect has
information pertinent to a crime.

3.

Oppressive Interrogation: i.e., only acceptable for the government to use
when necessary to avoid imminent harm in the most extreme
circumstances.

4.

Torture: i.e., this is an unacceptable method for the government to use in
any circumstance.
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We found statistically significant evidence that the empathy gap
biased the participants' evaluations of all three interrogation tactics.
First, the empathy gap affected their severity assessments:
participants in a cold (i.e., pain free) state underestimated the
severity of each interrogation tactic compared to participants who
were directly experiencing pain. Second, the empathy gap affected
participants' normative assessments: those who were not
experiencing any pain assessed the tactics as more ethical than those
who were actively experiencing pain. Finally, the empathy gap
affected the categorical assessments of participants: participants in a
cold state were more likely than participants who were experiencing
pain to categorize the tactic as legally acceptable interrogation (as
opposed to unlawful torture).
In these first three studies, we demonstrated a discrepancy
between the evaluations of interrogation tactics made by those who
were and were not experiencing the visceral state induced by the
tactic. However, it remained unclear whether those in a neutral state
or those in a hot state were more accurate, as compared to the
evaluations of people actually experiencing a tactic. To test this, we
This
ran a fourth study on exposure to cold temperatures.
as
condition,
water
experiment included an ice water and a warm
some
before, but we additionally included a condition in which
participants actually experienced the tactic. We had participants in
the actual experience condition stand outside without a coat in belowfreezing weather while they evaluated the tactic's severity. We then
compared these participants' evaluations with those collected from
participants in the ice water and the neutral condition. Here, we
found that participants in the actual experience and ice water
conditions rated the tactic as significantly more severe than
participants in the neutral condition. However, the evaluations of
participants in the actual experience and the cold-water condition did
not significantly differ from each other. This suggests that the
experience of a slight version of the visceral state induced by a tactic
actually improves the accuracy of judgments about the tactic's
severity.
In short, this series of experiments provides robust evidence that
our ability to recognize torture is much more psychologically complex
than simply "knowing it when you see it." The findings suggest that
empathy gaps for physical and psychological pain undermine our
ability to objectively evaluate interrogation practices. People simply
cannot appreciate the severity of interrogation practices that they
themselves are not experiencing-a psychological constraint that in
effect encourages an underinclusive understanding of torture. By
underestimating the pain of enhanced interrogation, people may
perceive objectively torturous practices to be morally or legally
acceptable.

2011]

TORTURE IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER

115

Other, more anecdotal evidence supports the empathy gap's
sobering effects on evaluations of enhanced tactics. In one famous
example, at the bottom of a Justice Department memo in which the
use of a stress position involving prolonged standing is described,
then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote, "I stand for 8-10
hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?"136 Also, on two
separate occasions, members of the media-Chicago radio personality
Eric "Mancow" Muller and Vanity Fair writer Christopher
Hutchins-voluntarily underwent waterboarding in an effort to
garner first-hand proof that the tactic does not amount to torture. 3 7
Mancow claimed that he initially felt that he would "laugh
[waterboarding] off."' 3 8 On both occasions, the participant's opinion
of the tactic was completely altered by the experience. As Mancow
admitted afterwards, "it is way worse than I thought it would
be ... and I don't want to say this: absolutely torture." 3 9 Hitchens
confessed to being haunted by the experience for months afterward,
professing that "if waterboarding does not constitute torture, then
there is no such thing as torture." 40
A last important aspect of the empathy gap phenomenon is that
past experience with pain (or any other emotional state) does not help
to bridge the hot-cold empathy gap. For example, in one experiment
that we conducted, one group of participants was exposed to pain
before, but not during, their evaluation of an interrogation tactic. We
found that prior experience with pain did not help people overcome
the empathy gap-they had to be actively experiencing pain in order
to understand its full severity. This is an important point because
one might argue that if policy makers have, at some point in time,
experienced the methods that they use in their training, they should
have a more objective understanding of pain severity. Yet this is not
the case. In fact, in several experiments, we have documented
counterintuitive evidence that past experience actually widens the
empathy gap because it gives people the false impression that if they
managed to endure it, it must not be that bad. Therefore, past
experience with an interrogation technique does not mitigate the
problems of the empathy gap.
As a practical matter, our empathy gap findings emphasize the
innate subjectivity of torture; purely "objective" evaluations that are
removed from emotion and visceral experience tend to produce

Tom Malinowski, The Logic of Torture, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at B7.
136.
Ryan Pollyea, Mancow Waterboarded,Admits It's Torture, NBC CHICAGO (May
137.
22, 2009), httpJ/www.nbechicago.com/news/local-beat/Mancow-Takes-on-Waterboardingand-Loses.html.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
140.
Christopher Hitchens, Believe Me, It's Torture, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, at
70.
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inherently biased underestimations of the severity of interrogation
tactics. This weighs against the strictly objective conception of
torture currently endorsed by the United States, which attempts to
shift the focus of torture inquiries away from the subjective suffering
of the victims by concentrating on the intent and conduct of the
interrogators. 141 In an understanding released contemporaneously
with its ratification of the CAT, the United States provided the caveat
that its interpretation of a torturous act required the act to have been
"specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering." 142 Therefore, under this definition, severe mental pain or
suffering is insufficient; the interrogator must intend to torture the
victim. However, the empathy gap in torture evaluations counsels
against the intent requirement. Indeed, our findings suggest that it
is extremely likely that interrogators who are not experiencing the
pain or distress first-hand never truly understand the severity of
their actions. 143
In our research, we find that the momentary visceral state of an
evaluator-a variable wholly unrelated to the severity of
interrogation tactics-systematically biases evaluations of the
severity of interrogation tactics. Thus, our research provides more
evidence of the invalidity of the severity standard as a construct for
delineating a bright line between torture and lesser treatments.
Together with the difficulty of achieving inter-rater reliability,144 the
potential biasing effects of situation-driven motivated inferences and
the empathy gap suggest that the severity standard is both unreliable
and invalid. In Part III, we discuss the practical implications of our
argument, focusing on the question of what the inability to define a
bright line means for torture policy more generally.

See Convention Against Torture Hearing, supra note 11, at 18 (casting
141.
torture as "conduct calculated to generate severe and prolonged mental suffering of the
type which can properly be viewed as rising to the level of torture").
136 CONG. REc. 817,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). This standard has been
142.
criticized extensively by academics. See Renee C. Redman, Defining 'Torture" The
CollateralEffect on Immigration Law of the Attorney General's Narrow Interpretation
of "SpecificallyIntended" When Applied to United States Interrogators,62 N.Y.U. ANN.

SuRv. AM. L. 465 (2007).
In fact, others have argued that professional interrogators may be
143.
especially prone to the empathy gap. See Luban, supra note 62, at 1446-47 (remarking
that interrogators who complete training for their craft are often "inured to levels of
violence and pain that would make ordinary people vomit at the sight").
144.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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PART III: HONING CLOSE OR STEERING CLEAR: THE IMPORTANCE
OF A BRIGHT LINE IN REFERENCE TO A PROHIBITION

The impossibility of accurately discerning a bright line between
torture and enhanced interrogation rebuts the argument that torture
is something that "we know when we see."
This has important implications for the way that we think about
and construct torture policy. The search for a bright line between
what is prohibited and what is permitted is itself an important
indicator of a particular underlying approach: it implies an interest in
knowing the borderline of acceptable action, most often with the
purpose of approaching it.145 In arguing for the inappropriateness of
policies that seek to establish and approach the bright line that
defines torture, this Part employs Jeremy Waldron's distinction
between a malum in se and a malum prohibitum interpretation of the
torture prohibition.146 A malum in se approach is properly applied to
a prohibition-such as the prohibition against rape-that codifies an
absolute wrong.14 7 Legal codification of such prohibitions is intended
to "articulate this sense of wrongness and fill in the details to make
that sense of wrongness administrable." 48 However, if some act is
not explicitly prohibited by codified law, it does not necessarily follow
that the act is permitted, and it certainly does not follow that the act
is endorsed. For example, it would be grossly misguided to apply
strict textualism to a rape statute and assume that anything not
expressly prohibited is therefore freely permitted or even encouraged.
It would be repugnant for a person to consciously structure their
romantic interactions to hew as close as possible to the line
demarcating rape, and such an individual would not be seen as
blameless even if that person never crossed the line. Setting policy
with reference to a malum in se interpretation of a prohibition does
not, therefore, end with a determination of the "bright line" that
defines what is prohibited.149

145.

See Waldron, supra note 7, at 1699, 1701.

146.
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1951); Waldron, supra note 7, at
1692 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 379 n.21 (1985)).
147.
See Waldron, supra note 7, at 1691 ("So, for example, a statute prohibiting
murder characteristically does not make unlawful what was previously permissible; it
simply expresses more clearly the unlawfulness of something which was impermissible
all along.").

148.

Id.

At minimum, a malum in se approach would suggest a requirement that
149.
policy makers obtain hard evidence that any tactics they employ are more efficacious
than less extreme tactics, in addition to being justified under the circumstances.
Whereas a debate about the efficacy of extreme interrogation policies is outside the
purview of this Article, there is certainly no consensus that they are effective. For an
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A malum prohibitum approach, in contrast, is appropriately
applied to a prohibition that involves something that is only wrong
insofar as it is formally prohibited.15 0 If an action is not explicitly
mentioned or addressed in the prohibition, it is permitted.15 We
tend to approach taxes in this way: if some type of asset is not
expressly taxed by the tax code, then we can assume that it is not
wrong to refrain from paying taxes on it. In contrast to potential
rapists, tax payers are expected to shade their economic activities as
close as possible to the legal limit, without crossing it, and those who
do so are seen as savvy rather than repulsive.
Therefore, a malum prohibitum approach to interrogation policy
would mean that people could consult legal instruments to determine
the point at which tactics become severe enough to amount to torture.
Then, they could infer that any tactics falling below that threshold
are fair game for interrogators. They can tiptoe, with impunity, as
close to the line as they like, so long as they do not cross it. Indeed,
for purposes of intelligence gathering, we have an interest in
structuring policies with the ultimate goal of approaching the line
without crossing it. Under a malum prohibitum interpretation,
therefore, a precise definition of the threshold-in the present case,
the "bright line" between torture and everything else-is critically
important for setting policy.
The U.S. interrogation policy under the George W. Bush
Administration seemed to follow the malum prohibitum approach.
Members of the Administration who were in charge of interrogation
policy claimed that the risks posed by terrorism were so severe that
the United States had an interest in employing the most extreme
tactics possible without crossing the line into torture-in getting as
close to torture as possible.15 2 Indeed, the emergence of the category
of "enhanced" interrogation tactics is indicative of a malum
prohibitum approach. Active public debate about the appropriateness
of these ambiguous interrogation tactics did not begin until after they
had been in widespread use for a number of years. In mid-2004, the

introduction

to the intricacies

of that

debate,

see Convention on 'Enhanced'

Interrogation,supra note 10.
Waldron, supra note 7, at 1692.
150.
151.
Id.
Bradford Berenson, one of the White House lawyers involved in decisions
152.
about how the Administration should respond to 9/11, says of the days immediately
following 9/11:
There were thousands of bereaved American families. Everyone was expecting
additional attacks. ... Preventing another attack should always be within the
law. But if you have to err on the side of being too aggressive or not aggressive
enough, you'd err by being too aggressive.

Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power. The Legal Mind Behind the White House's War on
Terror, NEW YORKER, July 2006, at 44.
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CIA announced its plans to suspend, pending legal review, a wide
range of these tactics that had been previously employed against
detainees suspected of involvement with al-Qaida.s5 3 Crucially, the
impetus for the sudden suspension of enhanced tactics was an effort
to confirm their legality, or, more specifically, to garner a legal
opinion about whether or not each tactic should be categorized as
torture.15 4 This approach implies an underlying assumption that if a
tactic is legal, then it is permitted; once a bright line was established,
then the United States could continue on with any interrogation
methods that did not transgress the line. The established bright line,
in effect, would define the policy. Former Vice President Cheney's
more recent rhetoric in defense of the use of enhanced tactics betrays
a similar assumption: "[In choosing interrogation practices,] we
proceeded very cautiously. We checked. We had the Justice
Department issue the requisite opinions in order to know where the
bright lines were that you could not cross."15 5
Professor Waldron is correct that a malum prohibitum approach
to the torture prohibition is misguided. 156 There are a number of
reasons why we should not treat torture like taxes. First, a malum
prohibitum approach seems contrary to the intent of the covenants
and treaties that form the prohibition: it is facially obvious that these
treaties are not written like the tax code. They do not attempt to
provide an explicit or detailed account of what torture is. Indeed,
neither the Geneva Conventions nor the ICCPR attempt to proffer
any definition for torture, let alone an all-encompassing one.1 57
Further, the CAT expressly provides that "cruel, inhuman or
degrading" offenses-those just less severe than torture on a scale of
severity-are not permissible.1 5 8 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, for
example, although the Court held that the five interrogation tactics in
question 5 e did not amount to torture, it nevertheless ultimately
found that the tactics were prohibited by virtue of being cruel,

153.

See Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold; Memo on Methods of

Interrogation Had Wide Review, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at Al (confirming these
techniques had been "used to elicit intelligence from al Qaeda leaders such as Abu
Zubaida and Khalid Sheik Mohammed").
Id. (quoting a former CIA officer's claim that the interrogations had been
154.
put on hold "until we can sort out whether we are sure we're on legal ground"); see also
World News: Cheney Defends Hard Line Tactics (ABC television broadcast Dec. 16,
2008) [hereinafter World News], available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=
6464697&page=l (including an interview with former Vice President Dick Cheney who
claims that the Administration "wouldn't do [any interrogation tactic] without making
certain it was authorized and that it was legal").
World News, supra note 154.
155.
156.
Waldron, supra note 7, at 1692-93 (arguing that torture is not properly
conceived as a malum prohibitum).
157.
See supranotes 4-5 and accompanying text.
158.
See CAT, supranote 3, art. 16.
159.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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inhuman, and degrading. 160 This result suggests that the line
between torture and cruel or inhuman treatments may be more
symbolic than substantive.
Second, a malum prohibitum approach risks quickly becoming
outdated or insufficient unless statutory constructions can be easily
revisited and reformed to reflect changes in social understandings or
the emergence of new activities that are outside the purview of the
original prohibitive instrument. This is, of course, true of the tax
code; the tax code changes every year to reflect changes in things like
demographics, the economy, and the emergence of new classifications
of income. It quickly would become outdated if it did not evolve with
the population. However, adaptive celerity is certainly not a trait of
the torture prohibition; it would be prohibitively difficult and costly to
hold massive international conventions whenever new interrogation
tactics are developed.
Third-and most closely connected to our own research-a
malum prohibitum approach is only valid to the extent that a bright
line between torture and enhanced interrogation can be accurately
drawn. If, as we have argued, people are naturally motivated to draw
the bright line too high, efforts to approach the bright line face an
imminent risk of crossing it. This risk escalates in times of crisis,
when, as discussed above, administrators are especially
psychologically motivated to narrowly construe torture. 161 These are,
unfortunately, exactly the times when the bright line is most likely to
matter.
PART IV: CONCLUSION

This Article demonstrates the multifaceted challenges
obstructing the demarcation of a bright line between torture and
enhanced interrogation. The severity standard currently used to
distinguish between torture and less extreme techniques does not
lend itself to a viable search for a bright line. In evaluating the
quality of any attempt to draw a bright line definition of torture
under the current standard, we have considered its reliability and
validity. Reliability indicates the degree to which the measure yields
consistent results over time and across different judges. Validity
indicates the degree to which the measure yields results that are
meaningful and accurate.
In purportedly classifying types of interrogation that do or do not
constitute torture, the severity test lacks both reliability and validity.
The divergent jurisprudence addressed in our comparative case

160.

25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).

161.

See supra Part II.
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analysis demonstrates the practical difficulties of using existing
standards to "know torture when we see it." There is marked
variation in the way that different jurisdictions define and apply the
torture standard, suggesting low inter-rater reliability. Further,
psychological research on judgments and decision making suggests
that torture evaluations are influenced by two systematic biases,
which involve the evaluator's political situation and his momentary
The self-serving bias and the phenomenon of
visceral state.
motivated reasoning suggest that people are naturally inclined to
narrowly define torture in times of political distress. In addition, our
own recent experimental studies provide robust evidence that the
empathy gap affects evaluations of enhanced interrogation tactics.
We found that a person's evaluations of enhanced interrogation
tactics are affected by their immediate visceral proximity to the
experiences attendant to the tactic. People who are experiencing a
state that is induced by a tactic tend to judge the tactic as less ethical
and more severe than people who are not experiencing the state. We
also found evidence that the empathy gap affects what people define
as torture: when people are experiencing a visceral state induced by a
tactic, they are more likely to classify that tactic as torture. Our
research suggests that evaluators who are not experiencing the type
of pain or discomfort attendant to an interrogation tactic have
difficulty understanding the tactic's severity.
Admittedly, the social psychological research contained in this
Article does not answer the question of precisely where the line
should be drawn between torture and cruel or inhuman treatments.
Instead, social psychology suggests that the line is much more
difficult to determine than likely assumed, and the line tends to be
drawn in an underinclusive way, especially in times of political
distress. Whether or not we recognize something as torture changes
depending on the situation and visceral state in which we make our
This bright line is, therefore, both blurry and
evaluation.
inconsistent. Lacking a reliable bright line to consult, a malum
prohibitum interpretation of the torture prohibition is misguided and
likely to result in transgressions.
Ultimately, it is our hope that knowledge of the self-serving bias
and the hot-cold empathy gap-and the attendant potential for a
systematically underinclusive conception of torture-may lead to
more consistent interrogation policies and informed discussions about
what torture is and what metrics we should rely on (or not rely on) to
recognize it. In light of the inclination to too narrowly construe the
torture prohibition, we need to begin researching and enforcing
institutional and administrative checks and balances to protect the
prohibition from being transgressed during periods of political
Such an endeavor is especially urgent because of the
distress.
growing popularity of subtler physical and psychological interrogation
tactics, the severity of which evaluators are especially likely to
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underestimate. 162 As contended by Judge O'Donoghue, a dissenting
voice in Ireland v. United Kingdom, "One is not bound to regard
torture as only present in a mediaeval dungeon where the appliances
of rack and thumbscrew or similar devices were employed." 163
Several recent developments in international torture law and
policy prognosticate a potential movement toward a more inclusive
definition of torture in jurisdictions that previously have adopted
relatively conservative torture definitions. For example, the ECHR
acknowledged an "increasingly high standard being required in the
area of the protection of human rights and fundamental
liberties . . . [which calls for] greater firmness in assessing breaches of

the fundamental values of democratic societies." 1 6 4 In the United
States, too, government officials are revisiting and reevaluating the
country's interrogation policies. Shortly after taking office, President
Obama banned the CIA's use of interrogation treatments that are not
also permitted by the U.S. military and ordered that even unlawful
combatants would be treated in compliance with Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Convention.165 Given the innate psychological tendency
to under evaluate the concept of torture and the severity of
interrogation tactics, our findings support a movement toward more
conservative interrogation policies and a more comprehensive
jurisprudential definition of torture.

162.
See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 47, at 15; Yarwood, supra note 34, at
326 ("Even where there is consensus as to what satisfies a threshold of severe
suffering, doubt lingers as to whether there is scope within this standard for
contemporary forms of torture .... ).
163.
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) (1978) (separate opinion of Judge O'Donoghue).
164.
Siliadin v. France, App. No. 73316/01, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16, 1 121 (2005).
165.
Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, The End of Torture: Obama Banishes
Bush's Interrogation Tactics, NEWSWEEK,
Jan.
22,
2009, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/181007; Joby Warrick & Karen DeYoung, Obama
Reverses Bush Policies on Detention and Interrogation, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2009, at
A06.

